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IN HIE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, : Case No. 20080419-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
1 his Court should reverse because there is a reasonable probability thai the jury 
would have acquitted but for the trial court's decision to give Instruction 56. Instruction 
56 improperly commented on the evidence by unduly bolstering Creed's eyewitness 
testimony and validating the jurors' natural inclination to believe eyewitness testimony 
despite its inherent unreliability. 
Part I: Creed's brief encounter with Sandoval and Phillips during the November 3 
party did not increase the reliability of his identification. On the contrary, scientific 
research shows that a brief encounter with a suspect may actually decrease the reliability 
of an identification by generating "unconscious transference." Unconscious transference 
describes the phenomenon where eyewitnesses confuse contexts and place a somewhat 
familiar face in the wrong context. Creed, as the host of the party, had limited time to 
interact with Sandoval and Phillips. Further, to the extent that Creed took notice of them, 
his notice decreased the reliability of his identification because he developed an 
immediate prejudice against them, thereby increasing the likelihood of unconscious 
transference. Additionally, Creed's identification exhibited other factors that raised 
"grave concerns'' about its reliability. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986). 
These factors are discussed in the opening brief. See Aplt. Br. at 30-33. 
Part II: Neither the Long instruction nor any of the other instructions given to the 
jury cured the prejudicial effect of Instruction 56. Scientific research shows that 
cautionary instructions like the Long instruction have a limited ability to sensitize jurors 
to the fallibility of eyewitness identification. At the time of Sandoval's trial, however, 
the only avenue available to combat the jury's strong predisposition to believe eyewitness 
testimony was the Long instruction. Given the unreliability of Creed's identification, the 
lack of corroborating evidence, and the weakness of the State's case, the Long instruction 
should have been sufficient to protect Sandoval against the substantial danger of mistaken 
identification. Instruction 56, however, undermined the tenuous protection offered by the 
Long instruction. By highlighting Creed's eyewitness testimony and identifying it 
specifically as testimony capable of convicting Sandoval without any corroboration, 
Instruction 56 unduly bolstered Creed's testimony. Additionally, it validated the jurors' 
natural inclination to give Creed's eyewitness testimony great weight despite its flaws. 
2 
ARGUMENT1 
I. CREED'S LIMITED INTERACTION WITH SANDOVAL AND 
PHILLIPS DURING THE NOVEMBER THIRD PARTY 
DECREASED THE RELIABILITY OF HIS IDENTIFICATION 
Studies suggest that "the witness's familiarity with the identified suspect" may 
"bolster the reliability of the visual identification." Long, 721 P.2d at 491; Christopher 
M. Walters, Admission of Hxperl Testimony on Lycwitncss Identification, 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1402, 1422 (July 1985) ("Studies on eyewitness capacity uniformly refer to the 
responsive characteristics of witnesses who arc unfamiliar with the person they arc to 
identify; they have little proven bearing in a case where the witness has had some prior 
relationship with the defendant."); Samuel R. Gross. Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice 
in Capital Cases. 61 AUT Law and Contcmp. Probs. 125. 137 (Autumn 1998) r[F]or 
about half of all violent crimes, eyewitness identifications arc extremely reliable because 
the crimes were committed by relatives, friends, or others who are known to the victims." 
(citation omitted)). 
wTt is unclear" from the research, however, "how extensive this prior relationship 
must have been before" it increases the reliability of the identification. Walters, 
Some research in this brief--particularly the research in Part 1 about "unconscious 
transference," the statistics in Part II regarding the leading causes of wrongful 
convictions in the United States, and the research in Part II about the fallibility of 
eyewitness testimony and the remedies available to criminal defendants in eyewitness 
identification cases—was taken from the opening and reply briefs filed by Michael D. 
Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, and Kathcrine Carrcau of Sncll & Wilmer L.L.P. in State 
v. Cloptcn, Case No. 20080631-SC. 
Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 Cal, L. Rev. at 1422 
(citation omitted). At a minimum, scientific research suggests that the prior relationship 
must be an actual acquaintance and not just a brief encounter. See, e.g.. Steven Pcnrod, 
Elizabeth Loftus. & John Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A 
Psychological Perspective., The Psychology of the Courtroom 119, 142 (N. Kerr el a I. 
cds. 1982). Contrary to common sense, scientific research shows that a brief encounter 
with a suspect who is not an acquaintance may actually decrease the reliability of an 
identification by generating an instance of "unconscious transference." IdL Unconscious 
transference describes the phenomenon where eyewitnesses identify innocent bystanders 
rather than the actual perpetrator because they "confusfc] their contexts and placfc] a 
somewhat familiar face in the wrong context." Id 
In the two cases cited by the State—United States v. Dobbs, 449 F.3d 904 (8th 
Cir. 2006) and I lager v. United States. 856 A.2d 1143 (D.C. 2004) -the prior 
relationships between the defendants and the eyewitnesses were extensive. See Dobbs, 
449 F.3d at 906, 909-11; Hagcr, 856 A.2d at 1145-49. Plus, the government presented 
corroborating evidence. Sec id. Thus, relying on the research cited by the State, the 
appellate courts in those cases determined that the prior relationships between the 
defendants and the eyewitnesses increased the reliability of the identification. See 
Dobbs, 449 F.3d at 909-11:1 lager, 856 A.2d at 1148-49. 
In Dobbs, for example, "numerous witnesses acquainted with" the defendants 
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"'identified them as the men visible on the [surveillance] tape." Dobbs, 449 F.3d at 906. 
On appeal, the defendants argued the witness identifications were inadmissible because 
the officers used suggestive techniques to obtain the identifications. Id. at 909. The 
appellate court affirmed because "[t]he women who identified [the defendants] on the 
tape were not eyewitnesses being asked to recall their impression of a stranger during a 
short encounter in the emotionally charged context of an armed robbery." Id at 909-10. 
"Rather, the three women who testified were individuals already acquainted with | the 
defendants]." Id. Specifically, the witnesses included one defendant's "live-in 
girlfriend," "the mother of two of [that defendant's] children" who had known both 
defendants "for twenty years," and a woman who knew one defendant and testified that 
anyone who knew him would "know the difference" between him and the man originally 
arrested. Id at 907. Plus, the State corroborated the identifications with the store clerk's 
testimony, the surveillance tape, and one defendant's admission. Id at 910. 
Likewise, in Hager, the eyewitness saw the defendant "on a daily basis outside 
[the victim's] apartment building" for "well over a year," "exchanged greetings with 
him," and "heard him converse with other people." I lager. 856 A.2d at 1145-46. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his 
expert on the fallibility of eyewitness identification. Id. at 1148-49. The appellate court 
affirmed because "the studies on which [the expert] would have relied concern) ed] the 
reliability of a stranger identification, not an identification of a person known to the 
5 
witness, as in this case.'* Id. at 1148-49. Plus, "the government presented evidence 
corroborating [the eyewitness's| identification." Id. at 1149 (citation omitted). That 
corroborating evidence included a witness who saw the defendant with the murder 
weapon prior to the murder, the defendant's "fingerprints lifted from the maga/inc clip of 
the" murder weapon, and incriminating statements made by the defendant. Id. at 1145. 
Similarly, in a recent case affirmed by this Court, the eyewitnesses had prior 
relationships with the defendant and the government presented evidence to corroborate 
the eyewitnesses* identifications. See State v. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, 186 P.3d 
1004, cert, granted, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah 2008). In Clopten. the State presented three 
eyewitnesses. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205 at ^20. The first witness "attended the concert 
with" the defendant, "saw the murder, and rode with [the defendant] in the get-away 
vehicle." Id The second "had a conversation with [the defendant] earlier in the 
evening," "recognized" him "[mjoments before the shooting," and "made a reference to 
the prior conversation which [the defendant) acknowledged." UL And the third "learned 
[the defendant's! name, observed the confrontation between" between him and victim, 
saw him shoot victim, "and identified the shooter to police by description and by name." 
Id. On appeal, this Court held "there was no prejudicial error" when the trial court 
excluded the defendant's expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications 
because the three eyewitnesses "were not complete strangers to" the defendant. Id. 
Additionally, the defendant was dressed in a distinctive red suit when he committed the 
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offense and he admitted the offense to a state witness. Id. at |^9. 
Conversely, in this case, Creed's limited interaction with Sandoval and Phillips 
during the November 3 party did not make Creed's identification "'extremely reliable.*" 
Aple. Br. at 28 (quoting Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 
AUT Law and Contemp. Probs. at 137). Unlike the eyewitnesses in Dobbs, Hager, and 
Clopten, Creed was not well acquainted with Sandoval or Phillips. He had not interacted 
with them on numerous occasions or had his identification of them ratified moments 
before the offense. Further, unlike the eyewitnesses in Dobbs and Clopten, Creed was 
not an innocent bystander devoid of the stress and perceptual failings suffered by victims. 
Rather, Creed met Sandoval and Phillips just once at a party where he was the host 
and was preoccupied with entertaining guests. R. 232:44, 141. During the party, Creed 
~ To the extent that the eyewitnesses in Clopten had less substantial relationships with the 
defendant than the eyewitnesses in Dobbs and I lager, it is important to note that this 
Court's decision in Clopten is not yet final. It is currently before the Utah Supreme Court 
on a writ of certiorari. See Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, cert, granted, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah 
2008). Additionally, although the eyewitness testimony in Clopten was less reliable than 
in Dobbs and Hager, it was much more reliable than the eyewitness testimony in this 
case. In Clopten, three eyewitnesses identified the defendant, all three knew the 
defendant before witnessing the offense, and none were victims of the offense. See 
Clopten, 2008 U f App 205 at ^|20. Additionally, the defendant committed the offense 
while wearing a distinctive red suit and admitted his guilt to a state witness. See id. at 
fiftj3, 9. Whereas, in this case, Creed was the only eyewitness; he was the victim of the 
violent crime at issue; his identification was affected by the stressful and frightening 
nature of the encounter and by his personal bias or prejudice toward Sandoval and 
Phillips; and he changed his testimony about his identification during trial. Sec Aplt. Br. 
at 30-37. Additionally, his identification was the only evidence that linked Sandoval to 
the offense. See R. 232-34. The State's remaining evidence was circumstantial and 
relied largely on Creed's biased feelings toward Sandoval and Phillips. Sec R. 232-34. 
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had ten guests at his parents' house, five of whom were strangers to him. R. 232:44-45, 
141; 233:31, 47-48. The party spanned the kitchen, sunroom, backyard, and game room. 
R. 232:48, 81-82. 85. 129-30; 233:56, 90. During the evening, Creed and his guests 
talked, watched television, played pool, played pinball, and periodically went to the 
backyard to smoke. R. 232:45, 49, 81-82, 85, 130; 233:90. Creed's interaction with 
Sandoval during the evening was so limited that he did not even learn Sandoval's name. 
R. 232:97. 
To the extent that Creed took notice of Sandoval and Phillips, his notice decreased 
the reliability of his identification because he developed an immediate "prejudice" 
against them. R. 232:77, 91, 221. He believed they were wearing gang attire. R. 232:68-
69. He thought that they "didn't fit in" and that they "were giving [himj the evil eye." R. 
232:78-79. And he wanted them to leave, but he did not ask them to go because he was 
afraid they would retaliate. R. 232:77, 91. 
On November 4, Creed was confronted by two strangers at night. R. 232:37; 
233:119, 134/ The closer stranger was "crouched down" like "a line backer." R. 
232:39-40, 99-100. The encounter was so disturbing to Creed that he immediately 
"tackled" the crouching stranger and the two wrestled together in the bushes. R. 232:40, 
97, 101. Moments later, Creed "hcar[d] a pop" and believed he had been "shot at." R. 
232:41-42, 107-10. The strangers then ran away. The brief encounter left Creed in 
J
 The State correctly notes that Aaron Hall testified it "'wasn't completely dark*" on 
November 4 at 9:00 p.m. Aple. Br. at 10 n.3 (quoting R. 233:119) (emphasis omitted). 
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"shock'' and so frightened that he played "dead" rather than calling the police. R. 232:42. 
109-10. In this stressful, frightening situation, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury, if properly instructed, would have believed that Creed's identification of Sandoval 
and Phillips was mistaken. See Aplt. Br. at 32-33. This is particularly true given the 
other factors in the evidence that raise wCgrave concerns" about the reliability of Creed's 
identification, Long, 721 P.2d at 487, the lack of corroborating evidence, and the 
numerous weaknesses in the State's case. Sice Aplt. Br. at 30-37. 
II. THE LONG INSTRUCTION DID NOT CURE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ERRONEOUS DECISION TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 56 
The Long instruction did not cure the prejudicial effect of Instruction 56. See 
Aplc. Br. at 33-34. To the contrary, Instruction 56 undermined the effectiveness of the 
Long instruction and left Sandoval unprotected against the substantial danger of mistaken 
identification. See Aplt. Br. at 24-37. 
"Mistaken eyewitness identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions 
in the United States, accounting for 88% of wrongful rape convictions and 50% of 
wrongful murder convictions between 1989 and 2003.v State v. Clopten, Case No. 
20080631-SC, Aplt. Br. at 15 (citing Timothy P. O'Toolc & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. 
Braithwaitc Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 110 (2006)): sec John C. 
Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. Meissncr, Disputed Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Court Review 12, 12 
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(1999) (explaining that ''not only is eyewitness evidence powerful, it is also more likely 
to be erroneous than any other type of evidence" (emphasis in original)). 
Mistaken identification is the leading cause of wrongful conviction because jurors 
wCdo not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony" and "'give such testimony great 
weight" despite its "deep and generally unperceived Haws.'" Long, 721 P.2d at 490, 492; 
see Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability 
of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 3, 23, 28 (June 2006) (noting that juries 
are reluctant to accept the fallibility of eyewitness testimony because the reasons for its 
fallibility are "quite counterintuitive and hardly commonsensicar); Edward Stein, The 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness 
Identification, 2 Law, Probability & Risk 295, 297 (2003) (explaining that scientific 
evidence shows "eyewitness testimony is systematically fallible in ways that lead away 
from truth and towards unjust verdicts"); Aplt. Br. at 27-30. 
At present, the only avenue available to defendants to sensiti/e jurors to the 
fallibility of eyewitness testimony and to protect against mistaken identification is the 
Long instruction. See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Since our supreme court issued Long more 
than twenty years ago, defendants have attempted to supplement the Long instruction 
with expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identification, but these attempts 
have been routinely rejected. See, e.g., State v. Kinscy, 797 P.2d 424, 429 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (deferring to trial court's determination that expert testimony was 
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unnecessary and Long instruction adequately educated the jury about the unreliability o[ 
eyewitness testimony); State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,1fl[41-44, 27 P.3d 1133 (holding 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony where Long 
instruction was given and expert testimony "did not deal with the specific facts from th|c| 
case"); State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,WO, 13, 15, 17, 48 P.3d 953 (holding exclusion 
of expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion where Long instruction was given 
because the substance of expert testimony "can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury 
through the judge in a jury instruction"); State v. Macstas, 2002 UT 123, f||74, 63 P.3d 
621 (upholding trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony). 
Although Utah law does not currently allow more protection than the Long 
instruction, it also docs not allow any less. Giving a Long instruction is the "minimum" 
action warranted "whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such 
an instruction is requested by the defense." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Anything less "could 
well deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution." Id 
Utah's appellate courts and scientific literature, however, have questioned the 
capacity of a cautionary instruction alone to adequately convey "the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification" to jurors. Long, 721 P.2d at 488; sec, e.g., id. at 492 n.5 
(noting that "a cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea" and "[ f|ull evaluation of 
the efficacy of cautionary instructions must await further experience"): Cloptcn, 2008 UT 
11 
App 205 at ^19; Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert rcstimony and 
Jury Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43, 52 (1989) (explaining that a jury 
instruction is only "minimally effective" because it "points only to certain factors without 
explaining the relative impact those factors have on memory or identification accuracy"). 
In Long, even as it adopted the cautionary instruction approach, our supreme court 
questioned the adequacy of a cautionary instruction to sensitize jurors to the "deep and 
generally unperceived flaws in'* eyewitness testimony. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. More 
recently, in Clopten, this Court said: 
[CJourts and legal commentators have argued that jury instructions and 
cross-examinations do not adequately address the vagaries of eyewitness 
identification. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 l;.2d 1224, 1230 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) ("To the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great 
confidence in an inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly 
been seen as an effective way to reveal the weaknesses in a witness' 
recollection of an event."); Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit 
Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, Fed. Cts. 
L.Rcv. 1. 25 (2007) ("Jury instructions do not explain the complexities 
about perception and memory in a way a properly qualified person can. 
Expert testimony . . . can do that far better than being told the results of 
scientific research in a conclusory manner by a judge[,j especially since the 
jury instructions arc given far too late in a trial to help jurors evaluate 
relevant eyewitness testimony with information beyond their common 
knowledge.'' (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard A. Wise ct aL A 
Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J.Crim. L. & Criminology, 807. 
833 (2007) ("[^judges' instructions do not serve as an effective safeguard 
against mistaken identifications and convictions and . . , expert testimony is 
therefore more effective than judges* instructions as a safeguard." 
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jacqueline 
McMurtric. The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 Am.Crim. L. Rev. 1271, 1277 (2005) ("Although cross-
examination is a powerful tool for exposing lies, it is not particularly 
effective when used against eyewitnesses who believe they are telling the 
12 
truth."; Michael R. Eeippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About 
Eyewitness Memory. 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y &E. 909. 924 (1995) ("Finally, 
judge's cautionary instructions also arc no panacea. Current versions arc 
inaccurate, overly broad, and easily lost amid a lengthy presentation of 
other closing instructions. Moreover, research . . . suggests instructions do 
not effectively teach jurors about how to evaluate eyewitness testimony.'' 
(citations omitted)); Cindy J. OTlagan, Note, When Seeing Is Not 
Believing: The Case of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 Geo. E.J. 741, 
754-55 (1993) ("Jury instructions should not be abandoned; they do have 
some value. But in some instances, courts have used jury instructions as an 
excuse to exclude expert testimony, claiming it is redundant. Because 
expert testimony is a more effective solution, jury instructions should be 
used as a complement to the expert testimony, not as a substituted 
(footnote omitted)); Frederic D. Woochcr, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive 
You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Identification, 29 Stan. E. Rev. 969, 994-95 (1976) HT|he witness on 
cross-examination will not and cannot reveal the factors that may have 
biased the identification, for many of these influences operate 
unconsciously.v); id at 1002-05 ("Although special cautionary instructions 
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony take a step in the right 
direction, they probably do not provide much protection against conviction 
of the innocent.'"). 
Cloptcn, 2008 UT App 205 at |^19. In a concurring opinion. Judge Thornc suggested that 
"the time has come to revisit the boundaries of trial court discretion in excluding expert 
testimony on the subject." Id. at {^32 (Thorne, J. concurring). 
Accepting Judge Thome's invitation, our supreme court granted a writ of certiorari 
in Cloptcn. See Cloptcn, 2008 UT App 205. cert, granted, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah Nov. 13, 
2008). At present, our supreme court is deliberating whether it is time to supplement the 
Eong instruction with or to abandon it in favor of a presumption that '"expert testimony 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification" is admissible. See State v. 
Cloptcn, Case No. 20080631-SC, Oral Argument held on June E 2009 (counsel for the 
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appellant quoting the issue stated in the order granting a writ of certiorari in that case); 
see Addendum A at p. 3. 
Based on the scientific consensus that expert testimony is necessary to properly 
sensitize jurors to the fallibility of eyewitness identification, there is a strong possibility 
that our supreme court's decision in CI op ten will supplement or replace the Long 
instruction with expert testimony. See Addendum A at pp. 17-18, 20-21. This result is 
particularly likely in a case such as this one, where there is only one eyewitness and no 
corroborating evidence. Sec Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (noting "questionable wisdom of 
allowing the uncorroborated identification testimony of one eyewitness to serve as the 
linchpin of the prosecution's case" (citations omitted)); People v. Campbell 847 P.2d 
228. 234-35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) ("When an eyewitness identification of a defendant is 
a key element of the prosecutor's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence 
giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on 
specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy 
of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it 
will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony." (citation omitted)); State v. DuBray, 
77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003) ("It shall be an abuse of discretion for a district court to 
disallow expert testimony on eyewitness testimony when no substantial corroborating 
evidence exists."): State v. Chappie. 660 P.2d 1208, 1218-24 (Ariz. 1983) (holding it was 
an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where "identification [was] the one 
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issue on which the guilt or innocence of defendant hinged"); State v. Whalcy, 406 S.H.2d 
369, 372 (S.C. 1991) (ww[AJn expert's testimony is admissible where, as here, the main 
issue is the identity of the perpetrator, the sole evidence of identity is eyewitness 
identification, and the identification is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving 
it independent reliability."). 
The State, in fact, during oral argument in Cloplcn, conceded that a cautionary 
instruction would offer little protection against mistaken identification in a case where 
there is one eyewitness and no corroborating evidence. Sec Addendum A at p. 25 (State 
conceding that "if you have one witness, and it's solely based on one witness, then 1 think 
it would be an abuse of discretion, in any case, to not allow the expert testimony"). 
Further, the State agreed that a trial court would abuse its discretion if it refused to allow 
expert testimony in such a case. See id. 
In this case, based on Utah's long and consistent history of excluding eyewitness 
expert testimony, Sandoval decided not to request expert testimony. Instead, as seemed 
prudent at the time, he focused his attention on the avenues historically available to 
him- -the Long instruction, cross-examination, and closing argument. In hindsight, it 
appears this decision was error because Utah's trend of ignoring the scientific evidence 
and routinely excluding eyewitness expert testimony may soon come to an end. See 
Addendum A. 
Regardless, at the time Sandoval went to trial, the Long instruction was the legal 
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remedy available to him to counteract the jury's predisposition to believe the eyewitness 
testimony. .See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Given the weakness of the Slate's case, the Long 
instruction should have been enough. And, as evidenced by the jury's difficulty reaching 
a verdict and questions concerning the credibility of Creed's identification and the 
meaning of reasonable doubt, it nearly was. R. 234-35. 
But science shows that the Long instruction's ability to sensitize a jury to the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification is tenuous. Sec, e.g., Pcnrod & Cutler, 
Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contcmp. Probs. at 
52 (explaining that a jury instruction is only "minimally effective'* because it "points only 
to certain factors without explaining the relative impact those factors have on memory or 
identification accuracy"); Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. at 44 (explaining that jury 
instructions "are given far too late in a trial to help jurors evaluate relevant eyewitness 
testimony with information beyond their common knowledge."); M.R. Leippe, The Case 
for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 909, 924 
(1995) ("Finally, judge's cautionary instructions also are no panacea. Current versions 
are inaccurate, overly broad, and easily lost amid a lengthy presentation of other closing 
instructions. Moreover, research . . . suggests instructions do not effectively teach jurors 
about how to evaluate eyewitness testimony." (citations omitted)); Cindy 0 1 lagan, 
When Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 Geo. L.J. 
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741, 754-55 (1993) ("Jury instructions should not be abandoned; they do have some 
value/' but "jury instructions should be used as a complement to the expert testimony, not 
as a substitute." (footnote omitted)); Frederic D. Woocher, Did your Kycs Deceive You?: 
Expert Psychological Testimony of the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 
Stan. L. Rev. 969, 1002-05 (1976-1977) (''Although special cautionary jury instructions 
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony take a step in the right direction, they 
probably do not provide much protection against conviction of the innocent."). 
If a trial court singles out the eyewitness's identification as testimony capable of 
convicting a defendant without any corroboration, there is a reasonable probability that 
the trial court's improper comment will reduce the protective quality of the Long 
instruction and reinforce the jury \s powerful inclination to believe the eyewitness, 
regardless of the weaknesses in his identification and/or in the State's case. Sec Long, 
721 P.2d at 492 (noting that giving a Long instruction is the "minimum" action warranted 
"whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is 
requested by the defense"). In addition to being an abuse of discretion, such an action 
"could well deny the defendant due process of law." Id. 
As explained in the opening brief, numerous factors raised "grave concerns" about 
the reliability of Creed's identification. Long, 721 P.2d at 487; sec Aplt. Br. at 32-33. 
Here, as in Long, "|l]he State's case hinged on the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony 
of a single witness the victim of the crime." Long, 721 P.2d at 487; compare R. 232-
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34. Further, Creed's opportunity to observe the burglars was brief and was hindered by 
the nighttime conditions and by his immediate and violent altercation with the first 
burglar. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Plus, Creed's identification may have been influenced by 
personal bias or prejudice or by the stress and fright he felt during the altercation, 
especially since the altercation, which involved a violent wrestling match and an apparent 
gunshot, left him in "shock.'* Aplt. Br. at 32-33. 
Additionally, numerous factors undermined the bclicvability of the State's case. 
In particular, Creed and Porter's story was suspicious; Creed changed his testimony about 
when he made his identification during trial; the evidence showed that it would have been 
difficult for Sandoval and Phillips to commit the offense: and the State, despite having 
several opportunities to corroborate Creed's identification during its investigation, elected 
not to. Aplt. Br. at 33-36. 
The weakness in the State's case is evident in the record. Before reaching a 
verdict, the jury deliberated for more than eight hours over two days, received a verdict-
urging instruction, and asked four questions- two regarding the credibility of Creed's 
identification and two dealing with reasonable doubt. Sec Aplt. Br. at 37. 
With such a weak case, the Long instruction should have been enough to protect 
Sandoval from the jury's unwarranted faith in eyewitness testimony. Sec Aplt. Br. at 30-
37. I he trial court, however, undermined the tenuous protection offered by the Long 
instruction when it gave Instruction 56 to the jury. Sec id. By highlighting Creed's 
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eyewitness testimony and identifying it specifically as testimony capable of convicting 
Sandoval without any corroboration, Instruction 56 unduly bolstered Creed's testimony. 
See R. 163. Additionally, it validated the jurors' natural inclination to disregard the I ong 
instruction and give eyewitness testimony "great weight" despite its "deep and generally 
unpcrceivcd flaws." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. This is particularly true given that the State, 
during closing argument, used Instruction 56 to argue that the jury should convict despite 
the State's 'less than perfect" investigation because Instruction 56 is "the law" and there 
was a "good solid identification . . . here, you can't dispute that. There is ID. There is a 
law [ | telling you there is, that's good testimony.'' R. 234:47-48.4 
Thus, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have acquitted but for the trial court's decision to unduly bolster Creed's 
eyewitness testimony by giving Instruction 56. 
For the same reason, the trial court's error was not cured by the other instructions given 
to the jury. !Scc Aple. Br. at 31-35. In his opening brief, Sandoval does not read 
Instruction 56 in isolation. See id. at 31-32. Nor docs he "attribute all of the jury's 
unfavorable deliberations to [Instruction 56]." Aple. Br. at 35 (citation omitted). Rather, 
Sandoval attributes the jury's unfavorable verdict to its failure to comprehend the 
fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony. In this case, Creed's identification was 
highly questionable and the State's investigation was woefully inadequate. See Aplt. Br. 
at 30-37. The record indicates that the jury was uncomfortable with Creed's 
identification and with the State's case. See Aplt. Br. at 37. Expert testimony was likely 
necessary to fully sensiti/c the jury to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Case 
law. however, did not allow for the admission of expert testimony at the time Sandoval 
went to trial. Accordingly, Sandoval relied on the only tools available to him at the 
time—the Long instruction, cross-examination, and closing argument. Given the 
weakness of Creed's eyewitness testimony and the State's case, the Long instruction 
should have been enough. The trial court, however, erroneously undermined the 
effectiveness of the Long instruction by giving Instruction 56 to the jury. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court 
impermissibly commented on the evidence when it gave Instruction 56 to the jury. 
SUBMITTHD this _ \ 2 ? day of August, 2009. 
LORI J. SliPPI r i 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Tab A 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE V. DEON CEOPTEN 
Oral Argument 
(June 1,2009) 
Case No. 20080631-SC 
Appearance for the Defense: Troy Boohcr and Michael Zimmerman 
Appearance for State: Jeffrey S. Gray 
Judge: Supreme Court Justices 
State v Cloptcn 1 Oial Aigumcnt 6/1/2009 
i JUSTICE DURHAM: We're here for oral argument in number one on our 
2 June calendar. State of Utah versus Dcon Cloptcn. I assume you've 
3 had a chance, on behalf of the Petitioner, to give your times to the 
4 clerk, so if you'd indicate your appearances for the record we can 
5 begin. 
6 ZIMMERMAN: Troy Boohcr and Michael Zimmerman, Snell and Wilmer. for 
7 the Petitioner, Dcon Clopten. 
8 JUSTICE DURIIAM: Thank you. 
9 GRAY: Jeff Gray, on behalf of the State. 
io JUSTICE DURHAM: Alright, thank you. You may proceed for the 
11 petitioner. 
12 ZIMMERMAN: Good morning. Your Honors. On behalf of my client. Dcon 
13 Cloptcn, we ask this Court to change the approach taken by Utah 
14 courts to the admission of expert testimony on the unreliability of 
15 eyewitness identifications. We ask the trial courts be instructed that 
16 they are to weigh proffered eyewitness expert testimony by the same 
17 702 and 403 rules of evidence standards they apply when addressing 
18 any other proffer of expert witness. And we ask the trial courts be 
19 told that in deciding whether to admit expert eyewitness testimony, 
20 they should not consider whether or not a Long cautionary 
21 instruction may be given. In the present case, the application of this 
22 approach leads to the conclusion that the trial court abused its 
Slate v Cloptcn 2 Oial Aigument 6/1/2009 
discretion in excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony. The error was not 
harmless. Much of the initial eyewitness testimony was uncertain as 
to the identity of the shooter and focused on his clothing. And that 
evidence, and the testimony they gave initially, or the comments 
they made initially, is fully consistent with the finding that Freddy 
White, not Dcon Cloptcn, was actually the shooter. Only over time 
did the witnesses' testimony become solidified and certain that it 
was Deon Cloptcn. Had Dr. Dodd testified there is a reasonable 
likelihood the jury would have found a reasonable doubt to believe 
that Deon Cloptcn was the murderer. The certiorari question which 
this Court framed for the parties is quote, wtWhcther a timely request 
for expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness 
identification should be presumed admissible" unquote. Apparently, 
the way this is framed has led the State to think we want Dr Dodd's 
proffer, and other similar eyewitness expert proffers, to be treated as 
special, and somehow presumed admissible. In fact, we're asking 
just the opposite. We ask only that this expert evidence be 
considered just as any other expert testimony under rules 702 and 
403. It may well be that the sheer weight of the uncontradicted 
scientific evidence showing the helpfulness of this sort of testimony 
will, in the real world, create an operative presumption that it should 
be admitted, unless the State can show the circumstances which 
3 OialAigumenl 6/1/2009 
1 make eyewitness testimony unreliable are not present. But that does 
2 not mean we are asking for a special rule only a level playing field 
3 for determining the admissibility of this evidence. In the present 
4 case, we're quite confident that Dr. Dodd's proposed testimony, 
5 which is summarized at page 252 to 263 of the record, can meet both 
6 Utah Rule of Evidence 702 as it existed in 2006, when this case was 
7 tried, and as it exists today. And it will not run afoul of Rule 403. I 
8 said that we ask that this expert testimony receive no special 
9 treatment. At present, expert eyewitness testimony does receive 
10 special treatment in Utah. It is not admitted, when other expert 
11 testimony on analogous subjects would be admitted. No trial court 
12 ruling excluding expert eyewitness testimony has ever been 
13 overturned, so long as a Long cautionary instruction is given. I think 
14 it's fair to say language in this Court's decisions has encouraged trial 
15 courts to exclude proffered expert eyewitness testimony, with 
16 confidence that they will not be reversed. 
17 JUSTICE PARRISII: But Counsel, I guess we've not reversed a trial court 
18 for admitting it, but at the same token, . . . 
19 ZIMMERMAN: Thai's true, Your Honor. That's true. But the fact that you 
20 have never reversed it, and that you've said things in your opinions 
21 suggesting it's unnecessary, has produced what the State told the 
trial judge was a quote,"trend" unquote, to deny its admission. And 
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1 that's an undeniable trend. The trial court here manifested that same 
2 special approach when it ruled on Dr. Dodd's testimony. The judge 
3 rejected it, reasoning, first, that it wouldn't assist the jury because 
4 quote, "the Long instruction does an adequate job", unquote. He 
5 then said Dr. Dodd's testimony would only quote, "confuse the 
6 issue." And then he said, rather oddly, that the proffered evidence of 
7 Dr. Dodd was cumulative of the Long instruction, which is not 
8 evidence. He therefore concluded the testimony was superfluous 
9 and would have no bearing on the jury's decision. 
10 JUSTICE PARRISH: So, Counsel, the complaint that you have with the way 
11 in which the trial judge exercised his discretion was simply his 
12 consideration of the Long instruction in the calculus of weighing 
13 whether or not the expert testimony ought to be admitted? If we 
14 could remove his consideration of the Long instruction, then you 
15 would have no basis for complaint? 
16 ZIMMERMAN: If you remove the consideration and also educate the trial 
17 judges of this State as to the fact that expert eyewitness testimony 
18 does not confuse the jury, is in fact helpful, if you actually took the 
19 science and looked at the fact that our judges need education about 
20 what this testimony does, that would be sufficient. I think if you 
21 look, particularly, at study number 14 in our bulky addenda, and 1 
22 know it's kind of a pain, but that is a survey of 160 trial judges, and 
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1 a few appellate judges, as to what they know about expert 
2 eyewitness testimony, what they know about its unreliability, and 
3 what they don't know and, in fact, it's fair to say that it shows they 
4 slightly know more than jurors, but they don't know very much. 
5 And that not knowing very much is precisely why this testimony 
6 does not get considered as it ought to be. Now, I would like to 
7 address why we think the presence of a Long instruction should not 
8 be taken into account. Long was decided in '86, 23 years ago. 
9 According to the opinion, it was in response to four circumstances 
10 that existed at that time: first, strong scientific evidence that 
11 eyewitness identifications have many pitfalls in their reliability. 
12 Second, equally strong evidence that those pitfalls are 
13 counterintuitive. People don't understand them, they don't believe 
14 them as a matter of course. Third, eyewitness testimony has a 
15 tremendously strong probative effect on jurors whether or not it's 
16 accurate. And, fourth, at that time that Utah trial courts routinely 
17 refused to give cautionary instructions when asked. In light of the 
18 science and the risk of wrongful convictions, the Long court ruled 
19 that cautionary instructions should be given to point out the potential 
20 weaknesses in eyewitness testimony. 
21 JUSTICE DURHAM: And that was, in fact, the only issue in Long, wasn't. . . 
22 ZIMMERMAN: That was, there was no other issue. . . . 
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1 JUSTICE DURHAM: . . . whether the instruction should be given. 
2 ZIMMERMAN: Now, it is worth noting that, in light of today. Long observed 
3 in a footnote, number 5, on page 492 that there was one 1976 study 
4 at the time suggesting that cautionary instructions wouldn't work 
5 and, in fact, the most they would do is make jurors skeptical but not 
6 sensitize them to being able to discriminate between reliable and 
7 unreliable testimony. But the Court said in that footnote, even 
8 though the Court went ahead and imposed the need for instruction, it 
9 said, quote "full evaluation of the efficacy of cautionary instructions 
10 must await further experience," Well, that further experience is 
n here, 23 years later. It shows that cautionary jury instructions arc 
12 not effective, no matter how they're written. If you look at the study 
13 in Item 2 of our appendix, you'll see that research has confirmed 
14 exactly what that 1976 study said that's cited in Long's footnote. 
15 Instructions alone do not make jurors more likely to be able to 
16 discriminate between reliable and unreliable eyewitness testimony. 
17 Therefore, today, things are today as they were when Long was 
18 decided. Defendants, against whom eyewitness evidence is 
19 introduced, today have the same risk of wrongful conviction that 
20 prompted the imposition of the Long requirement. 
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i JUSTICE DURRANT: Counsel, is that research more broadly applicable? 
2 That is, as a general matter, are jury instructions this ineffective or 
3 less ineffective than expert eye testimony. . . 
4 ZIMMERMAN: I think, excuse me, Justice Durrani. I think in this case the 
5 reason, if you look at that study that's in item 14 in the tabs, you'll 
6 see the reason that this is particularly ineffective is all of us think we 
7 know what we see. We think we know what we remember, and we 
8 think we're accurate. And, in fact, we're not. And that's just a 
9 fundamental fact about being a human being that never goes away. 
10 JUSTICE DURRANT: But that goes to memory, generally. 
11 ZIMMERMAN: Yes, it does. But it's particularly acute because the law relics 
12 so heavily on eyewitness identification. Eet me just point one thing 
13 that is, in fact, present today that wasn't present in 1986. Up until 
14 recently, you could say with a certain surety, you couldn't be 
15 contradicted with hard evidence, that the system does not often 
16 convict innocent people. In 1995, the U. S. Supreme Court said it 
17 was, quote "extremely rare" unquote, for people to have meritorious 
18 claims of innocence. But within a few years, the DNA revolution 
19 has shown that not to be true. The study in tab 7 points out that, as 
20 of the writing of that article in 2006, 340 serious felony convictions 
21 have been overturned, people have been exonerated- since 1989. Of 
22 those. 88 percent, it's estimated, of the rape cases resulted from bad 
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1 eyewitness identification. Fifty percent of the murder convictions 
2 resulted from bad eyewitness identification. If s the most potent 
3 evidence, because the witnesses believe they're telling the truth. 
4 Cross examination is worthless. 
5 JUSTICE WILKJNS: Which tab again. Counsel? 
6 ZIMMERMAN: That's tab 7, page 00205. 
7 JUSTICE WILKINS: What was the total number of cases during that. . . 
8 ZIMMERMAN: Three hundred and forty. 
9 JUSTICE WILKINS: What was the total number of cases during that same 
10 period of time where there were convictions? 
11 ZIMMERMAN: I have no idea. I don't know how many cases actually had 
12 DNA evidence either. If you extrapolate those percentages, those 
13 are only convictions where DNA was available. It docsnT talk about 
14 cases where people were convicted solely on eyewitness testimony. 
15 JUSTICE WILKINS: Ok. I understand it to be of the 340 cases. . . 
16 ZIMMERMAN: Thaf s right. 
n JUSTICE WILKINS: . . .eighty-eight. . . 
18 ZIMMERMAN: Eighty-eight percent. 
19 JUSTICE WILKINS: . . .yeah, but were there 340,000 convictions during the 
20 relevant period, or three hundred and forty million convictions 
21 during the relevant period? I mean, extremely rare could still be the 
22 case if the total number o[ felony convictions is monstrously huge. 
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1 ZIMMERMAN: I suppose it could be the case, Justice Wilkins, if, in fact, you 
2 assume that the cases in which DNA c\ idcncc is available to 
3 contradict an eyewitness arc somehow more eyewitness evidence 
4 dependant than cases in which there is no DNA evidence to 
5 contradict the eyewitness. 
6 JUS flCE WILKINS: Ell read it more carefully. 
7 ZIMMERMAN: If that rate of error is extrapolated. . . 
8 JUS riCE NEIIRING: Can you contemplate an expert rendering an opinion 
9 that expert testimony is so unreliable that it should not be considered 
10 at all in a case? 
11 ZIMMERMAN: No, not based on the science. I can contemplate a case where 
12 the expert is insufficiently qualified. I can contemplate a case where 
13 it's an eyewitness only identification; you arc identifying a close 
14 friend, a relative. In that case, the biases and the weaknesses in 
15 eyewitness identification arc unlikely to be present. And in that 
16 case, a judge might say 'You know, in this case none of your 
17 testimony is going to have any bearing. Em not going to admit it/ 
18 JUS flCE NEIIRING: Arc you aware of cases in which trial courts have 
19 permitted expert testimony on the question of the reliability of 
20 eyewitness testimony which have been appealed? 
21 ZIMMERMAN: I am not. I know that Dr. Dodd's resume, and again, al the 
22 record 252, says that he's testified in twenty cases in Utah and 
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1 Colorado. So he's testified somewhere, but Fm unfamiliar with the 
2 appeal of any of those cases. 
3 JUSTICE NEHRING: Maybe he's so effective that they generate acquittals 
4 and you'll never see an appeal. 
5 ZI MM! TIM AN: Well, if you actually, if you look at the studies about how 
6 strong eyewitness identification is, how much we believe it, no 
7 matter what. . . let me just read item six, the opening page of item six 
8 in our tabs. It talks about a fellow who was convicted of bad checks, 
9 29 bad check convictions. Seventeen eyewitnesses identified him as 
10 the guy who passed the bad checks. He was later exonerated, and 
11 the prosecutor said CwWhen the two men stood at the bar. I wondered 
12 how so many persons could have sworn the innocent man was the 
13 one who cashed the checks? The two men were as dissimilar in 
14 appearance as could be. There was several inches difference in 
15 height, and there wasn't any similarity about them. To this day, I 
16 cannot understand the positivencss of those witnesses. I know they 
17 fell they were swearing the truth. 1 know the police felt the man was 
18 guilty." So this is a case where the seeing is not believing is the 
19 reverse of the old adage. 
20 JUSTICE DURRANI: Counsel, what would preclude, if anything, the use of 
21 experts as to the general fallibility of memory? 
22 ZIMMERMAN: Nothing. 
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i JUSTICE DURRANT: What standard would we apply in. . . . 
2 ZIMMERMAN: I think State v. Adams, which Justice Wilkins wrote, is a case 
3 where there was an expert who got on the stand and basically said 
4 there was about a rape conviction of a Downs syndrome girl, a 
5 woman. And the expert got on the stand and said, tCognitivcly\ . . 
6 the defense was she'd been coached by her mother because her 
7 mother was estranged from the accused rapist. And the expert got 
8 on the stand and said, 'Cognitivcly, I don't believe this woman could 
9 be coached. She can't count to fifty. She can't remember her 
10 birthday. I don't believe it's possible to coach her/ And that was 
11 challenged on the grounds that the testimony went to the truth telling 
12 of the witness. And this Court said no, subtle difference, just like 
13 the Rimmasch case. It's not about whether she's telling the truth, 
14 it's about her cognitive capacity. And that's. I think Justice Wilkins 
15 said, that's a fine distinction, but it's a distinction. In this case. I 
16 would say one of the things that's been, one of the critiques leveled 
17 against this kind of testimony, is it's going, invading the province of 
18 the jury. Invading the province of the jury really means, if you 
19 deconstruct that language, it means the jury knows this already. The 
20 evidence is the jury docs not know this already. And. secondly, this 
21 is just like the Adams case. This is evidence about the capacity of 
22 the witness to know whether they're telling the truth. 
State v Cloptcn 12 Oial Aigumcnt 6/1/2009 
1 JUSTICE DURHAM: Counsel, arc there more questions? Sorry, your time 
2 has expired. 
3 ZIMMERMAN: Em having so much fun I didn't realize the time had run out. 
4 JUSTICE DURHAM: Thank you. You may respond. 
5 GRAY: May it please the Court, Counsel Jeff Gray on behalf of the State. 
6 The State's position in this case is simple. Under Utah law, trial 
7 judges stand as gatekeepers to the admission of expert testimony. 
8 There should be no special exception for expert testimony on 
9 eyewitness identification. 
10 JUSTICE DURHAM: Well, given the presence of the Long case, which is 
11 very unusual, I can't think of any other circumstance in which we 
12 have approved a cautionary instruction of this type, have we not 
13 created an evidentiary situation which is causing trial courts to 
14 believe that Long performs some kind of evidentiary function and, 
15 therefore, they're disadvantaging what would otherwise be fairly 
16 standard expert testimony on memory, cognitive capacity, 
17 eyewitness testimony, other things which we permit, and generally 
18 encourage so long as they fall within the admissibility standards? 
19 GRAY: Urn 
20 JUSTICE DURHAM: It seems to me what makes this whole set of 
21 circumstances special is not the treatment that's sought to be 
22 afforded to this expert testimony, but this Court's action in 
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1 approving a Long instruction in the hope. 23 years ago, that it would 
2 improve circumstances, given the science. 
3 GRAY: And. no doubt, I think Long actually did improve circumstances, 
4 but. . . 
5 JUSTICH DURHAM: You got any empirical evidence for that? 
6 GRAY: Urn, yeah, 1 mean, there's been. . . let's talk about those studies that 
7 the defendant has cited as far as the effectiveness of instructions. 
8 Most of those studies concerned the Telfaire instruction, and it's 
9 pretty much universally found that there's some problems with that 
10 as, quite frankly, this Court recognized in Long. They are relying on 
11 two studies, two studies involving a total of, it's either, 1*11 go 350. 
12 It's either 250 or 350, but three hundred and fifty subjects. And, 
13 what Greene found is that it did help them. It did help jurors 
14 understand those things. Now, the jury isn't out on that. But we've 
15 got three hundred and. . . . 
16 JUSTICE DURHAM: But, I guess my question is why should we stick with 
17 the whole notion of a cautionary instruction which, as this trial judge 
18 understood it, apparently is perceived, somehow, to perform an 
19 evidentiary function? Why shouldn't we move ahead and use the 
20 standard evidentiary rules to look at the admissibility of expert 
21 testimony in a standard fashion? 
22 GRAY: And we actually agree with that approach. 
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1 JUSTICE DURHAM: Ok, I thought you did. 
2 GRAY: Yes, we actually agree with that approach. In fact, first of all, the 
3 cases that this Court has decided on expert testimony regarding 
4 eyewitness identification, they never created this presumption that 
5 it's inadmissible. 
6 JUSTICE PARRISH: But has, in practice, has that been the way the trial 
7 courts of this State have read our prior case law? 
8 GRAY: Not at all. Let's take a look at Judge Fuchs in this very case. He 
9 noted that he had two prior cases where the defense asked that Dr. 
10 Dodd testify. In one of those cases he didn't allow the testimony. In 
11 the other case, he allowed the testimony. Alright, so he clearly 
12 understood that it was within his discretion. And in Hollcn, which 
13 was decided by this case, the district court allowed the testimony, 
14 but didn't allow it to a certain extent. 
15 JUSTICE PARRISH: Ok, but in this case, one of the factors that the Court 
16 considered in exercising his discretion to not allow the expert 
17 testimony was the existence of the Long instruction. Agreed? 
is GRAY: Yes. 
19 JUSTICE PARRISH: And why shouldn't we just put an end to that? I mean, 
20 the Long instruction isn't evidence, so why should the existence of 
21 the Long instruction play any part in the trial judge's decision as to 
22 whether or not the expert testimony should be admissible? 
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1 GRAY: Well, what we'd be doing is setting up a situation where we could 
2 never use, where counsel could never rely on the Long instruction. 
3 If there was a case of eyewitness identification, counsel would be 
4 ineffective if he did not go for the expert testimony, if he did not ask 
5 for expert testimony as opposed to the Long instruction. 
6 JUST1CL DURHAM: What's wrong with that? 
7 GRAY: Because we do not have the evidence that the Long instruction is 
8 ineffective. Again, we have two studies . . . 
9 JUSTICL DURIIAM: But we still have a functional problem that Justice 
10 ParrislTs question goes to, which is that a jury instruction does not 
11 ordinarily serve to give the jury evidence. 
12 GRAY: Right, ok, and I think where counsel, one thing that I think this Court 
13 should do is disavow the notion that if it's simply a lecture to the 
14 jury, that trial courts should not allow the expert testimony. 
15 JUSTICL NL11RING: What docs it mean to be simply a lecture to the jury? 
16 Please tell me what witness, of any stripe, is not lecturing the jury? 
17 Any effort to persuade a jury, anything a witness says is a lecture at 
18 some level. 
19 JUSTICL DURHAM: You agree with that, don't you? 
20 GRAY: Yes. Yes. I mean, what the expert testimony cases on this particular 
21 area have talked about is this amounts to nothing more than a lecture 
22 to the jury and, therefore, we can rely on the Long instruction. And 
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1 Em saying that, you know, in light, that's really not an appropriate 
2 basis alone to deny the expert testimony. Alright? And 1 think what 
3 the Court was talking about when it was talking about a lecture to 
4 the jury, about general principles and so forth, that clearly if we look 
5 at the new rule 702 and the comment thereto, it recognizes that we 
6 can have expert testimony that gives a dissertation or exposition of 
7 the principles. And we don't disagree with that. But again, let's 
8 turn back to the gate-keeping function of the trial courts. 
9 JUSTICE WILKINS: What I hear you saying, Mr. Gray, is that the State 
10 doesn't object to the use of an expert talking about the reliability of 
11 eyewitness testimony if the trial judge finds that it's necessary and 
12 appropriativc, more probative than unduly prejudicial, that it's not 
13 invading the province of the jury, that it's carefully crafted, that it's 
14 subject to cross-examination. 
15 GRAY: Yes. 
16 JUSTICE WILKINS: Is that what I hear you saying? 
17 GRAY: Yes. 
18 JUSTICE WILKINS: Well then, if that's the case, why not rely upon the trial 
19 judges to exercise that gatekeeping function, address it as a matter o[ 
20 expert testimony, and eliminate the routine use of an instruction 
21 which doesn't seem to allow for that? Am I misunderstanding what 
22 you're objection is? 
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1 GRAY: I don't have, I mean, I think the day of reliance on the Long 
2 instruction solely . . . 
3 JUSTICE WILKINS: May be over. 
4 GRAY: . . . is probably over. 
5 JUSTICE WILKINS: Yeah. 
6 GRAY: Ok. 
7 JUSTICE WILKINS: So what are we talking about here? I'm struggling to 
8 find out what it is you disagree with Mr. Zimmerman about. 
9 GRAY: Ok, let's talk about that. I was getting to the gatekeeping function. 
10 Now, Mr. Zimmerman suggests that they're not changing anything, 
11 that there's no special exception by, but, no court. What he wants is 
12 the Court to recognize or create a presumption of admissibility. That 
13 is not found anywhere, by this Court or by any other court. 
14 (multiple people speaking) 
15 JUSTICE DURHAM: Ok, I'll be gatekeeper. You go first and we'll work 
16 down the row. 
17 JUSTICE NEHRING: What I sense is that either through an accretion of 
18 culture around Long, or some other way, that courts are predisposed 
19 to believe that expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness is 
20 not helpful. And that helpfulness is, as I understand the rule, that's 
21 the only criterion. Is it helpful, or isn't. 
22 GRAY: Well, it also has to be reliable. 
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i JUSTICE NEHRING: Well, that's a subset of helpfulness. Unreliable expert 
2 testimony cannot, by definition, be helpful. 
3 GRAY: Well, as I see it, there's three basic gatekeeping functions of the trial 
4 court. First, it's to ensure that the scientific principles and 
5 techniques underlying the proffered testimony arc reliable. 
6 JUSTICE PARRISII: And in this case there's not a lot of dispute about the 
7 scientific evidence. 
8 GRAY: As far as these particular studies arc concerned, I don't think so. 1 
9 mean, they use, I mean, this is probabilistic, this is something that 
10 the Court. . . 
11 JUSTICE PARRISIi: Isn't it the nature of the scientific evidence that, in 
12 fact, gives rise to the presumption that Mr. Zimmerman is asking 
13 for? Does the fact that everybody acknowledges eyewitness 
14 testimony is fallible, that jurors don't appreciate it, because of the 
15 undisputed nature of the science, you're going to result in a situation 
16 where it's going to be helpful and come in? 
17 GRAY: To a certain extent it is. We agree that jurors, that the average juror, 
18 alright, believes that expert test-, or believes that eyewitness 
19 identification is more reliable than it might be. We believe that there 
20 are factors that are counter intuitive, ok, to juror understanding. But 
21 now we have experts who get on the stand, and Mr. Zimmerman 
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i w ants a blank check. They can testify to anything they want to 
2 because they're an expert on that. 
3 JUSTICE DURHAM: I suspect Mr. Zimmerman's going to get up and say 
4 they don't want a blank check. 
5 GRAY: 1 le won't say that, but. . . 
6 JUSTICE DURHAM: And I can't imagine that this Court w/ould write him or 
7 any other defense lawyer such a blank check. So, maybe if you'd 
8 focus on specifically the standards that you think should be part of a 
9 Court opinion on this question. 
10 GRAY: Ok. Again, ok. so the first gatekeeping function is to determine, ok. 
11 to assure that the scientific principles and techniques undcrl) ing the 
12 testimony is reliable. The second one is that the court ensures that 
13 the proffered testimony is founded on those principles and is 
14 otherwise relevant to the work at hand. Alright? And then the third 
15 one would be the court ensures that on balance, the proffered 
16 testimony will be helpful to the jury. 
17 JUS VICli DURIIAM: Pretty standard stuff. 
18 GRAY: Pretty standard. But again, if you look at, according to the defendant, 
19 they want a presumption of admissibility. That's never been. . . 
20 JUSTICE DURHAM: Actually, what I think they really want, and it's 
21 difficult to deal with the language here, the) want us to knock down 
22 the presumption of inadmissibility that the presence of the Long 
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1 instruction has created in the minds of many trial judges. And you 
2 have no objection to that, 1 take it? 
3 GRAY: No. To the extent that there's a presumption of inadmissibility, we 
4 would agree that that ought to be knocked down. 
5 JUSTICE PARRISII: And, in fact, the existence of the Long instruction 
6 shouldn't play any role in the judges' exercise of discretion? 
7 GRAY: Well, I think it can. and let me explain. That third point, as far as 
8 the proffered testimony, whether or not it'll be helpful to the fact 
9 finder. This Court has recognized that expert testimony, in itself, 
10 carries some dangers of undue reliance on the expert testimony 
11 itself, also misuse and confusion of the issues. So, it's still a 
12 balancing, that the helpfulness determination requires a case by case 
13 inquiry where the trial judge balances the probative value of the 
14 proffered testimony in a particular case against the danger its 
15 admission poses. It is not conducive to the one size fits all approach 
16 the defendant proposes. 
17 JUSTICE WILKINS: You've got to get over there. We know Mr. 
18 Zimmerman and I think you know that he doesn't always get his 
19 way with this Court and, historically, has not always gotten his way 
20 with this Court. So deal with us and not with him. But, what I hear 
21 you saying is that you donT have any problem with treating expert 
22 testimony regarding eyewitness identification as an expert under our 
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1 ordinary rubric of rule, and that you would include the possibility of 
2 a jury instruction, as opposed to expert testimony, when, in the trial 
3 judge's well founded discretion, that made more sense for helping 
4 the jury. 
5 GRAY: Yes. 
6 JUSTICE WILKINS: Is there something more to it than that? 
7 GRAY: Well, let's take a look at Rimmasch. 
8 JUSTICE WILKINS: Let's not, but go ahead, (multiple people speaking) Lm 
9 sorry, go ahead. 
10 JUSTICE DURHAM: Well, but I may want to stop you. It's hard for me to 
11 see how this is Rimmasch territory at all. The Rimmasch rule and 
12 standard was created for novel, new, experimental science that had 
13 not yet reached a generally accepted status in the scientific 
14 community. And it's hard to sec where this stuff has been around 
15 for a couple of decades or more, and is very well accepted, not just 
16 by the scientists but by courts, would be in the Rimmasch category. 
17 GRAY: Let me explain. First of all, the science, what we know that's been 
18 around for a couple of decades, if s limited. And I think it's 
19 important that courts to note that. In other words, we know that 
20 eyewitness identification is not as reliable. . . 
21 JUSTICE DURHAM: As jurors tend to think it is . . . 
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1 GRAY: . . .we know certain factors. But the science is not mature to the 
2 extent that we can say ;ok, because this factor is present here, 
3 therefore this witness is therefore less reliable.' Because it takes. . . 
4 JUST1CR DURHAM: But that doesn't mean that it's novel, it just means that 
5 it's limited, and it wouldn't be admissible if it wasn't strong enough 
6 to go to the case, to the facts of the case before the court, 
7 GRAY: Well, all I'm suggesting is that there's lots of studies and the studies 
8 are ongoing. 
9 JUSTICE DURHAM: Sure. That's right, I understand that. 
10 GRAY: The studies arc ongoing. 
11 JUSTICE DURHAM: But that doesn't get me to Rimmasch. 
12 GRAY: Well, ok. let me say. Ok, first of all, as part of the helpfulness, and 
13 Rimmasch talked about this, and I'm not going back to the novel 
14 scientific, it was talking about the helpfulness issue. And it talked 
15 about the nature of the testimony, and I think we have to take 
16 account of that. Ok. This is, I mean, we're talking about statistical 
17 probabilities and about the average person. . . . 
18 JUSTICE W1EKINS: But Mr. Gray, if your position is, as I understand it, 
19 that the trial judge, as gatekeeper, should evaluate that. Then, are 
20 you asking us to evaluate that as a broad blanket and say it's not 
21 admissible? 
22 GRAY: No, not at all. 
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1 JUSTICE WILKINS: Arc you asking us to evaluate it as a broad blanket and 
2 say it is admissible? 
3 GRAY: f m asking the Court, as in any other expert testimony situation, 
4 they look at it and determine whether or not the trial court abused its 
5 discretion. 
6 JUSTICE WILKINS: Ok, so now we're shifting to this case, as opposed to 
7 the general proposition? Is that where I lost you? Because as a 
8 general proposition, what I understand you saying is if we just apply 
9 our rules the way they're written and we should be ok. 
io GRAY: Yes, yes. 
11 JUSTICE WILKINS: Ok. So, in this case what happens if we do that? 
12 GRAY: In this case one of the things is the quality of the other evidence 
13 available. And let's take a look at the quality of the other evidence 
14 available. First. Defendant was identified b) Melissa Valde/ , a 
15 concert goer who spoke with Defendant. . . 
16 JUSTICE: DURHAM: But this goes, this goes then to the assumption that 
17 there's error, and we're looking at whether the error was harmless. 
18 That 's when you ' re looking for quality of the other evidence. 
ic) GRAY: Well. I 'm not sure what our courts ' decisions have talked about with 
20 respect to helpfulness, but they do say that you look at the qualit}' of 
21 the other evidence. 
22 JUSTICE DURHAM: You don't. . . .Em sorry, you have lost me now. 
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i GRAY: Ok. 
2 JUSTICE DURHAM: An analysis of the helpfulness of expert testimony on 
3 the function of human memory, it seems to me, would not be 
4 dependent on the fact that there were seventeen other eyewitnesses 
5 who were 100% sure this person was the defendant. 
6 GRAY: I think it would, I think it would. And, you know, when you have 
7 the, when you proffer the testimony the State can demonstrate what 
8 witnesses and what evidence they tend to call. And it can be. you 
9 know, if you have one witness, and it's solely based on one witness, 
10 then I think it would be an abuse of discretion, in any case, to not 
11 allow the expert testimony. But where you have other corroborating 
12 evidence, I donT think it would be. 
13 JUSTICE PARRISH: But what about the studies that were cited in Mr. 
14 Zimmerman's brief that indicate even when you have other 
15 corroborating evidence it's still a problem, because if the other 
16 corroborating evidence is really weak, even if the eyewitness 
17 identification is almost so weak as to be completely not helpful, 
18 juries will still tend to convict. 
19 GRAY: Well, ok, he's cited all these studies and a lot of them match the 
20 studies with what he would propose to testify. One of the big things 
21 that they focus on is this idea of transference. If they've seen him 
before they may misidentify him afterwards. Nowhere in the 
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1 summary of Dr. Dodd's testimony did he discuss that, nor did he 
2 discuss that when the trial court asked what he was going to discuss. 
3 And now Defendant would have us cherry pick this study out there 
4 and say 'this would have affected the whole thing.' And we don't 
5 even know the reliability of these studies either, 
6 JUSTICE DURRANT: Counsel, let me take another factor and just ask you 
7 how you suggest that we approach it? Take the presence of a 
8 weapon, take the presence of a weapon. Would you agree that the 
9 science is reliable and in support the conclusion that the presence of 
10 a weapon may diminish reliability? 
li GRAY: That it can. yes. 
12 JUSTTCli DURRANT: That it can. So we're over that hurdle, and we have 
13 that issue in this case. 
14 GRAY: Well, what's interesting is most of those studies is when the subject, 
15 or the witness feels threatened. Alright. And in this case, for 
16 example. Ms. Valdc/. she was never felt threatened by that, so that 
17 weapon focus isn't applicable. 
18 JUSTICE DURRANT: Well, she should certainly be allowed to argue that and 
19 put on an expert to that. . . 
20 GRAY: You know, in this case . . . 
21 JUS'l ICE DURRANT: . . .point, but would you quarrel with their expert 
22 testifying to that particular factor? 
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1 GRAY: No. But again 
2 JUSTICE DURRANT: And that would be regardless of the corroborative 
3 evidence, J take it? 
4 GRAY: You know, right, okay, it's within the trial court's discretion. I think 
5 Judge Fuchs could just as easily, and he almost did, allow the expert 
6 testimony, and it certainly would not be an abuse of his discretion. 
7 There are so many factors. I mean, he was identified by Andre 
8 Ilamby, alright, the red clothing. They make a lot of coh. this was 
9 just based on the red clothing.' Well, one of the things Dr. Dodd 
10 himself testified, or indicated in his summary, he didn't testify, but 
11 indicated in his summary, is that people pick that out quite readily. 
12 JUSTICE DURHAM: Well, but then you had a witness from across the street 
13 who said the shooter got in the backseat of the car. 
14 GRAY: I'm sorry, I. . . . 
15 JUSTICE DURHAM: And then you had a witness from across the street who 
16 said the shooter got into the passenger side of the car. 
17 GRAY: Yeah, and they were on the 11th floor. . . 
18 JUSTICE DURHAM: Yeah, but my point is you want to rely on 
19 corroborative testimony to assess helpfulness. You've got a lot of 
20 confusion in this case. 
21 GRAY: Well, again, I guess the question is, in this case. . . first of all, this 
22 proposal by Counsel at this time, was never proposed to the trial 
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i court. I mean, they quabbled with whether or not it was sufficient. 
2 But what we're relying on in this case, if we go down to the specifics 
3 of this case, is was the instruction sufficient to educate the jury on 
4 the various matters? And, I think if you look at that it was. And the 
5 research. I know my time, if 1 could finish. . . . 
6 JUSTICH DURHAM: Finish your sentence. 
7 GRAY: The research has not matured to the extent that we just throw out 
8 jury instructions and say they're of no use. And with that, we ask 
9 the Court to affirm. Thank you. 
10 JUSTICE DURHAM: Alright. Thank you very much Mr. Gray. You may 
11 reply. 
12 JUSTICH PARRISI1: Counsel, what is your, under your proposal, what is the 
13 place of a Long-type instruction in a case where expert testimony is 
14 admitted? Should the cautionary instruction be given nevertheless. 
15 or do we just throw it out entirely? 
16 Z1MMHRMAN: You know, I doiTt honestly know the answer to that. Judge. I 
17 think the c\ idence is pretty clear that no matter, you know, in Long 
18 there was a proposal to change the Teliairc instruction, like this 
19 would fix things, and the studies, I guess there were three studies, 
20 suggest that rewriting it docsnT much matter. There is some 
21 indication that it makes juries a little more skeptical of eyewitness 
testimony. There's no evidence of, that it makes them more 
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1 sensitive to discriminating between the truthful, not the truthful. I 
2 don't want to say truth, everybody's telling the truth, between the 
3 accurate and inaccurate testimony. So docs it fulfill a function? It's 
4 hard to say. The eyewitness. . .the big difference about putting on a 
5 live eyewitness, and I think the State's missing a little bit, is if, in 
6 fact, these eyewitnesses, an expert goes on, the State gets to put an 
7 expert on, the State gets to cross-examine the expert, and the real 
8 impact, I think, is that this evidence comes in as part of the trial. 
9 This is not read to the jury as one page out of twenty-five pages of 
10 instructions, this is part of the heart of the trial. And the more 
11 critical it is, you can assume, the more it's going to be argued over to 
12 the jury. So it's really going to make this a focus. In that context 
13 does the Long instruction matter? It may not matter. Do you throw 
14 it out? I don't know the answer to your question, candidly. You 
15 know, the cautious approach would be to not throw it out, maybe 
16 you do. But the other thing. . . 
17 JUSTICK NRIIRING: (unintclliblc) doing much? 
18 ZI MM] TIM AN: Yes. 
19 JUSTICE NEI HUNG: Would you believe it should be possible for an expert 
20 witness to render opinions critical of the observations made in the 
21 Long instruction? Is that fair game? Is the Long instruction fair 
22 game? 
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1 ZIMMERMAN: I suppose that's possible. I mean, you know, the Long 
2 instruction is generalized, as all these are. That's the problem, is 
3 they tend to be generalized and they miss some things. 
4 JUSTICE DURHAM: Well, it occurs to me the State might object to giving 
5 the Long instruction after you had already had all the evidence from 
6 the expert witness on the theory that it unfairly emphasized a 
7 particular set of evidence at trial, 
8 ZIMMERMAN: That's a good point, that's a good point. 
9 JUSTICE WILKINS: Mr. Zimmerman, was any effort made in this case to 
10 craft an instruction that would have addressed the deficiencies you 
11 sec? 
12 ZIMMERMAN: No, the objection was basically to not permitting the expert 
13 on. I think, given the science, there's no reason here to believe that 
14 an expert, differently crafted instruction would have made any 
15 difference. I think that, going to the corroboration point, and the 
16 State's talking about, you know, there were so many eyewitnesses 
17 here, what I just read you was seventeen eyewitnesses convicting 
18 this guy of cashing bad checks. Seventeen independent 
19 eyewitnesses. There's a great study Justice Parrish may have 
20 alluded to. a hypothetical that's in all the articles, where they 
21 construct a hypothetical sort of 7-11 robbery, and there's 
22 circumstancial evidence. 18% of the mock jurors convict. They 
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1 then have the clerk say 'that's the guy.' 72% convict. Then they put 
2 in evidence that the clerk is legally blind and isn't wearing his 
3 classes. 68% convict. The fact is, people think eyewitness 
4 testimony is it. They want something to grab on to, and another 
5 human being telling them a fact makes them believe it. Because 
6 they think they know what they sec, and they think they remember 
7 things. And the fact is they don't. In this case. I would really point 
8 out that it isn't only that there's testimony the shooter got in the 
9 passenger side of the car, there's testimony that the shooter was 
10 wearing a red jacket. Well, the only person wearing a long sleeve, 
11 red piece of clothing by the time the police pulled over his car was 
12 Mr. Cloptcn. He was the only one in the show-up that had a long 
13 sleeve, red shirt on. But, in fact, there was a long sleeve, red 
14 sweatshirt in the backseat of the car that the police ignored, that was 
15 left in the car, and when the car was claimed by a third person the 
16 sweatshirt disappeared. 
17 JUSTICE DURIIAM: And was that testimony about the existence of the red 
18 sweatshirt presented to the jury? 
19 ZIMMERMAN: There's a stipulation in the record, the last page of the record. 
20 there's a stipulation from the State. There was a sweatshirt, and it 
21 was turned over to somebody who took the car away, and nobody 
22 knows what it is. And there's a discrepancy in the evidence. Ms. 
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1 Valdcz says that the sweatshirt worn by the shooter did not have 
2 logos on it. did not have a zipper front. Mr, ClopteiTs sweatshirt had 
3 logos and a zipper front. We don't know what the other sweatshirt 
4 looked like. Thank you. 
5 JUSTICE DURHAM: Alright. Thank you very much. Counsel. We 
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